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Comcast/NBCU:
The FCC Provides a Roadmap for
Vertical Merger Analysis
BY JONATHAN B. BAKER
Commission's recent decision to allow the trans-
HE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONSaction between Comcast and General Electric's
NBC Universal (NBCU) affiliate to proceed sub-
ject to conditions' helped to fill a gap in the con-
temporary treatment of vertical mergers. The existence of
this gap was dramatized for me when, in drafting an antitrust
casebook section on vertical mergers, I was unable to find a
judicial opinion that assimilated the economic learning and
antitrust commentary on exclusionary conduct from the last
quarter-century. 2
The FCC is not a court but is an independent agency, like
the Federal Trade Commission, that issues adjudicative deci-
sions concerning acquisitions within its jurisdiction based on
an administrative record.' The FCC evaluates transactions
under a public interest standard, under which it considers the
effects of the transaction on competition-the same con-
cerns as are at issue under the antitrust laws-as well as other
aspects of communications policy. This article highlights the
competition policy aspects of the FCC's approach to the
Comcast/NBCU transaction, putting aside other issues the
FCC's decision raises, such as the way the conditions imposed
by the FCC addressed the concerns it identified or the impli-
cations of the FCC's order for the evolution of online video
distribution.
In its Comcast/NBCU Order, the FCC identified the fac-
tors any judicial or administrative tribunal would likely con-
sider today in evaluating the possibility of competitive harm
from a vertical transaction through input or customer fore-
closure. Moreover, in assessing these factors, the Commission
relied upon several economic models and empirical studies in
addition to documentary evidence and the submissions of the
applicants and complaining parties. Together, the legal frame-
work and economic evidence identified by the FCC provide
the missing roadmap for the contemporary analysis of verti-
cal mergers when the competitive concern involves exclusion.
Background
The Comcast/NBCU transaction combined Comcast's pro-
gramming assets-its interests in cable networks, including
regional sports networks, the Golf Channel, and Versus-
with those of NBCU, including the NBC broadcast net-
work, the Universal Studios film library, and cable networks
such as MSNBC, CNBC, Bravo, and USA Network-to
form a joint venture controlled by Comcast. The transaction
was mainly a vertical one:' NBCU was a major content
provider, while Comcast mainly operated farther down-
stream, in the distribution of that content.
Comcast is the leading multichannel video programming
distributor (MVPD) in the United States, with nearly one
quarter of MVPD subscribers nationwide and more than 40
percent of subscribers in seven of the ten largest metropolitan
areas. It is also a leading broadband Internet access provider.
The transaction was technically not a merger-General
Electric remained a minority owner of the programming joint
venture-but it was reasonably viewed as an acquisition
because Comcast would control the joint venture from its
inception and had obtained the option to buy out GE's inter-
est within eight years. In closely coordinated enforcement
efforts, both the FCC and the Department of Justice permit-
ted the transaction to proceed after imposing (the FCC) or
accepting in settlement (the DOJ) various conditions.'
Anticompetitive conduct is generally divided into two
broad categories, collusive and exclusionary, based on the
nature of the effects.' But the two kinds of effects are close-
ly related. When rival firms agree to act collectively, such as
through tacit or express collusion, they can reduce output and
raise price, as well as harm competition on non-price dimen-
sions, including quality and innovation. Exclusionary con-
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duct can harm competition by creating what is in effect an
involuntary (or even coerced) cartel or monopoly. A firm or
firms that would not voluntarily go along with a collusive
arrangement can be induced to act the same way and to the
same effect through exclusionary conduct by a dominant
firm or group of coordinating firms. If some firms are led to
reduce output and raise price involuntarily, while the remain-
ing market participants do so voluntarily, the outcome for
buyers is the same as if all firms participated in a marketwide
cartel.
A vertical merger can harm competition by facilitating
exclusion or collusion.7 The exclusionary possibilities involve
foreclosure of unaffiliated downstream rivals from access to
the integrated firm's upstream product (input foreclosure),
and foreclosure of unaffiliated upstream rivals from access to
the integrated firm's downstream business (customer fore-
closure).' In both of these cases, the term "foreclosure" is
understood broadly to include price-raising strategies as well
as complete exclusion.' The FCC's opinion addressed exclu-
sionary concerns at both levels: the possibility that the inte-
grated entity would harm competition in video distribution
by foreclosing Comcast's video distribution rivals from access
to the joint venture's programming, and the possibility that
it would harm competition in video programming by deny-
ing rival programming networks access to Comcast's video
distribution customers.
Analytical Roadmap
In its Comcast/NBCU Order, the FCC set forth a detailed
legal roadmap for analyzing exclusionary harm from vertical
merger. The Commission articulated its approach most clear-
ly in the context of evaluating input foreclosure, i.e., the
possibility that the transaction would allow Comcast to
obtain or maintain market power in video distribution by
preventing rival MVPDs from obtaining access to video pro-
gramming or by raising the price of that programming. Its
approach "adapt[ed} an analytical framework employed in
antitrust law"io by examining, in separate steps, exclusion,
harm to competition, and whether the transactions benefits
were likely to predominate over those harms.
Exclusion ofRivals. In its first step, the FCC evaluated
whether the transaction would increase the ability and incen-
tive of the integrated firm to exclude competitors, in this case
by "giv[ing] Comcast an increased ability to disadvantage
some or all of its video distribution rivals by exclusion, caus-
ing them to become less effective competitors." n Because
this exclusionary possibility involved the foreclosure of pro-
gramming, the rivals at issue were Comcast's downstream
competitors in video distribution.
The Commission considered Comcast's ability to harm its
distribution rivals by engaging in three possible exclusionary
strategies: (1) permanently cutting off an MVPD rival from
access to the joint venture's video programming, (2) tem-
porarily withholding that access, and (3) raising rivals' costs
by increasing the price of programming to video distribution
In its Comcast/NBCU Order, the FCC set forth a
detailed legal roadmap for analyzing exclusionary
harm from vertical merger. The Commission
articulated its approach most clearly in the context
of evaluating input foreclosure, i.e., the possibility
that the transaction would allow Comcast to obtain
or maintain market power in video distribution by
preventing rival MVPDs from obtaining access to
video programming or by raising the price of
that programming.
competitors. All of these strategies involved forms of input
foreclosure. 12
The Commission found that Comcast could disadvan-
tage downstream rivals by engaging in each of these strategies.
The two withholding strategies could harm Comcast's rivals
because the joint venture controlled "marquee programming"
that was "important to Comcast's competitors and without
good substitutes from other sources."13 Without access to var-
ious broadcast and cable networks controlled by the joint
venture, individually or in blocks, "other MVPDs likely
would lose significant numbers of subscribers to Comcast,
substantially harming those MVPD's that compete with
Comcast in video distribution." The Commission also
found that the foreclosed rivals could not "practically or inex-
pensively avoid the harm by substituting other program-
ming. "" In addition, the FCC concluded that after the trans-
action, the joint venture would have an incentive and the
ability to raise the price of joint venture programming, lead-
ing to an increase in programming costs for Comcast's video
distribution rivals, because the transaction would improve the
joint venture's bargaining position in negotiating the sale of
its programming.1
Harm to Competition. Second, the FCC asked whether
the exclusion of rivals, in this case the foreclosure of down-
stream video distributors, would result in harm to competi-
tion at that level. This step would be satisfied if the foreclosed
rivals constrained the pricing of the remaining firms, but it
would not be satisfied if, for example, the foreclosed rivals
were collectively small and had limited ability to expand."
The FCC concluded that successful exclusion employing
any of the three input foreclosure strategies analyzed in the
first step would likely permit Comcast to obtain or maintain
market power downstream. It reached this conclusion in part
though an analysis of market structure: "by defining video
distribution markets, and finding that Comcast could use
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exclusionary program access strategies to reduce competi-
tion from all significant current and potential rivals partici-
pating in those markets."" The FCC defined the relevant
video distribution market to be MVPD services within local
cable franchise areas and found that "[e]very MVPD rival
that participate[d] along with Comcast" in each relevant
market "purchase[d] most if not all" of the joint venture's pro-
gramming.' Accordingly, the joint venture would not only
have the ability "to exclude all Comcast's rivals" from its pro-
gramming, "whether by withholding the programming or
raising its price," but also the ability to "harm[ ] competition
in MVPD services in each of Comcast's franchise areas." 20
Although the FCC's decision was predicated on its find-
ing that the integrated firm could exclude all video distribu-
tion rivals, harm to all competitors was not a necessary con-
dition for finding harm to competition. The Commission
indicated that it could have found harm to competition if
some but not all rivals were foreclosed. To do so, it would
have to have found either that "the foreclosed rivals con-
strained Comcast's pricing" or that "the remaining rivals
would go along with allowing output in the market to fall and
the market price to rise rather than treating that outcome as
an opportunity to compete more aggressively." 21 The first of
these possibilities would presumably be satisfied if a hori-
zontal merger among Comcast and the small group of exclud-
ed rivals would result in adverse unilateral competitive effects,
as might be the case if competition is localized within the rel-
evant market. 2 2 The second would arise if the remaining
rivals would engage in parallel accommodating conduct, as
might generate coordinated competitive effects.23
As part of the second step in its framework, the FCC
analyzed whether each exclusionary strategy it considered-
temporary or permanent withholding of programming or a
cost-raising strategy-was likely to be profitable for Comcast
after the transaction. A price-raising strategy would be prof-
itable in all markets, the FCC found, because "Comcast's
improved bargaining position would arise without addition-
al expenditures." 24 By contrast, strategies involving with-
holding programming would be costly because they would
require the integrated firm to give up revenues from the
foreclosed MVPD. Hence such strategies would be prof-
itable only if the gains from conferring market power on
Comcast's video distribution businesses (or protecting exist-
ing market power from erosion) would exceed the costs asso-
ciated with that foregone revenue. After extensive economic
analysis, the Commission determined that permanent and
temporary withholding strategies would be profitable in
many markets. 25 The FCC also cited evidence in its record
that Comcast had found it profitable to foreclose an MVPD
rival from access to one of its networks in the past.26
The FCC analyzed an input foreclosure threat involving
potential video distribution rivals the same way as it analyzed
the possible foreclosure of MVPDs when it examined the
joint venture's incentive to foreclose Comcast's nascent online
rivals from access to video content. It viewed online video dis-
tributors (OVDs) as "a potential competitive threat to
Comcast's MVPD service," 2 and found that Comcast would
have "the incentive and ability to discriminate against, thwart
the development of, or otherwise take anticompetitive actions
against OVDs." 28
Evaluating Potential Benefits. The FCC identified the
remedies that would prevent these harms before undertaking
the third step of its analysis, i.e., evaluating the competitive
benefits of the transaction claimed by Comcast/NBCU and
comparing them with the harms to competition. This
approach differs from the approach a court would be expect-
ed to take in considering a challenge to a merger under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, reflecting the different statutory
frameworks for FCC review and antitrust review of proposed
mergers. An antitrust tribunal is concerned only with pro-
tecting competition; thus it would be expected to compare
the competitive benefits of the proposed transaction with
the harms to competition before considering remedies, and
only impose remedies if it concludes that the harms pre-
dominate. 29
The FCC has a broader mandate. Before approving the
Comcast/NBCU transaction, the FCC was obliged to find
affirmatively that it served the public interest. In making
that determination, the FCC considered not only whether
the merger fostered competitiono but also whether it
advanced other communications policy objectives, such as
ensuring that a diversity of information sources and view-
points are available to the public, accelerating the private-sec-
tor deployment of advanced telecommunications services,
and assuring attention to local community concerns. In its
review of the Comcast/NBCU transaction, the FCC identi-
fied both competition-related and non-competition concerns
and formulated conditions that would resolve both, before
considering the potential public interest benefits of the trans-
action.31
In the FCC's review of public interest benefits, the Com-
mission analyzed several possible efficiencies that would also
be relevant in a competition analysis under the Clayton Act.
These included (1) claims that the combination would
enhance prospects for innovation by reducing the transac-
tions costs associated with coordinating content develop-
ment with the development of new forms of media distribu-
tion; (2) cost savings said to arise from the elimination of the
double marginalization of programming costs; and (3) cost
reductions claimed to result from increased economies of
scale and scope. In general, the FCC credited these possibil-
ities, but not to the extent claimed by Comcast. The FCC
found them to be plausible in principle, but in some respects
speculative, overstated, or unsubstantiated.32 Of these effi-
ciency claims, the double marginalization argument was sub-
ject to the most extensive economic analysis.
33
Analysis of Customer Foreclosure
The FCC adopted the same general framework to analyze the
threat of customer foreclosure-the possibility that Comcast
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would harm competition in the market for video program-
ming by disadvantaging programming networks owned by
upstream rivals that are close substitutes for networks in the
joint venture through foreclosing their access to Comcast's
distribution system. 4 The FCC considered a range of exclu-
sionary strategies, including denying the rival programming
network carriage on Comcast's distribution system, placing
that network in a less advantageous tier, or making it more
difficult for subscribers to find that network, as by giving it
a less advantageous channel number. These strategies could
harm the rival programming networks by reducing their
The FCC's conclusions were supported by several
economic studies conducted by the FCC staff. The
analytical approaches underlying these studies were
not invented by the staff. They were employed in
previous FCC merger cases or suggested by the
outside economists participating in the Commission's
review, whether working for Comcast or for other
interested parties with concerns.
viewership, thereby rendering them less attractive to adver-
tisers and so reducing their revenues and profits. "As a result,"
the Commission concluded, "these unaffiliated networks may
compete less aggressively with NBCU networks, allowing
the latter to obtain or . . . maintain market power with
respect to advertisers seeking access to their viewers.""
In reaching this conclusion, the FCC relied on an eco-
nomic study suggesting that Comcast "may have in the past
discriminated in program access and carriage in favor of affil-
iated networks for anticompetitive reasons." 6 The FCC also
looked to "the consequences of [the] transaction for the struc-
ture of programming markets,"3 7 finding in particular that
the joint venture "will include networks that could be con-
sidered close substitutes for a much larger set of unaffiliated
programming" than was the case for Comcast before the
transaction. 38 For example, the FCC described the CNBC
network, which would now become a part of the joint ven-
ture, as "likely a close substitute" for Bloomberg TV, a rival
business news network.39 The FCC recognized that if Com-
cast foreclosed Bloomberg TV from access to Comcast's video
distribution system, the exclusion of that programming net-
work could harm competition "by reducing a competitive
constraint, with the adverse effect that increases with per-
ceived substitutability."40 In this case, the FCC concluded,
" [b]y foreclosing or disadvantaging rival programming net-
works" like Bloomberg TV, "Comcast can increase sub-
scribership or advertising revenues for its own programming
content," which would include its post-transaction interest in
CNBC.4 1
Economic Studies
The FCC's conclusions were supported by several economic
studies conducted by the FCC staff. The analytical approach-
es underlying these studies were not invented by the staff.
They were employed in previous FCC merger cases or sug-
gested by the outside economists participating in the Com-
mission's review, whether working for Comcast or for other
interested parties with concerns. But they were refined in
their application to the Comcast/NBCU transaction. Because
the Commission relied upon them in evaluating this trans-
action, they are likely to be emulated in competition analy-
ses of future vertical mergers threatening anticompetitive
exclusion.
Foreclosure Profitability 'Arithmetic." The FCC
assessed the post-transaction profitability to Comcast of ex-
clusionary strategies involving the temporary or permanent
withholding of joint venture programming from rival
MVPDs through modeling of the financial benefits and
costs to Comcast of one specific exclusionary possibility:
cutting off a rival MVPD from access to the programs air-
ing on an NBC broadcast station owned by the joint ven-
ture.42 Comcast would gain as some subscribers switch from
the rival MVPD in order to receive the programming, there-
by giving Comcast additional subscription fees on its own
video distribution service, as well as additional profits if
the new subscribers also sign up for Comcast's broadband or
telephony services.43 The costs of this strategy to Comcast
would involve the lost advertising fees and re-transmission
consent fees from those consumers that would remain with
the rival MVPD.
The analysis was conducted under the conservative
assumption (that is, an assumption by which foreclosure
would be less profitable to Comcast) that successful foreclo-
sure of a downstream rival would not lead Comcast to
increase the subscription price to consumers or the retrans-
mission consent fee it receives from other MVPDs.4 1 Many
parameters of the model, such as profits per subscriber and
advertising rates per subscriber, were taken from party doc-
uments or proposed by Comcast's economists and accepted
by the Commission.
The most extensive analysis concerned the determination
of two key parameters: the fraction of subscribers of the rival
MVPD that would depart for some other MVPD in the
event the rival could not carry the NBC network ("departure
rate"), and the fraction of those that would choose Comcast
rather than some other MVPD ("diversion rate").4 5 The
Commission identified the departure rate through a "differ-
ence-in-differences" econometric study of the consequences
of a retransmission dispute during which the DISH direct
broadcast satellite distribution system lost the ability to carry
a broadcast programming network for six months in multi-
ple cities, 6 and identified the diversion rate by relying on
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both survey evidence submitted into the record by an MVPD
concerned about the transaction and internal Comcast stud-
ies.4 After conducting its profitability analysis for a number
of geographic regions, the FCC concluded that post-trans-
action Comcast would "almost always" profit from a tempo-
rary foreclosure strategy and would "often" profit from a per-
manent foreclosure strategy."
Bargaining Analysis of Programming Prices. The
Commission assessed the likely magnitude of price increases
arising from the vertical aspect of the transaction by cali-
brating an economic model of the bargaining between the
joint venture and a rival MVPD over the price of program-
ming. 4 Its analysis relied on the Nash bargaining model. 0
The Nash bargaining model explains the division of the gains
from negotiation (the bargaining surplus) in terms of each
party's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)
and the parties' relative patience or bargaining skill.
Suppose, for example, that a prospective seller and buyer
have entered into negotiations for the sale of a house. The
buyer would not be willing to pay more than $300,000, and
the seller would be willing to sell as long as she receives at least
$250,000. These "reservation prices" are determined by each
side's preferences and alternatives. In particular, they depend
on the parties' BATNAs. The seller's reservation price may be
$250,000 because she knows that another buyer would be
willing to pay that much for the house. The buyer's reserva-
tion price may be $300,000 because he could purchase a
smaller house in a less attractive location for $275,000, and
would rather buy the $275,000 house than pay more than
$300,000 for the house being negotiated.
The difference between the two reservation prices,
$50,000 in this example, represents the joint gain (bargain-
ing surplus) from reaching a deal. But the split of the bar-
gaining surplus depends on the price at which the transaction
is made. At a purchase price of $290,000, the seller will
receive most of the surplus ($40,000 out of $50,000). At a
price of $260,000, the buyer will receive most of the surplus,
while the parties split the surplus evenly at a price of
$275,000. The Nash bargaining theory suggests that the
lion's share of the bargaining surplus will go to the party that
faces less time pressure to reach an agreement or has greater
bargaining skill. In the house buying example, if the buyer is
in no rush to complete the negotiations, while the seller
needs to sell in a hurry, the seller will likely come down in
price more quickly than the buyer will come up. As a result,
the negotiated price is likely to be closer to $250,000 than to
$300,000. The willingness and ability to delay gives the
buyer bargaining leverage. By contrast, if both parties face
similar costs of delay, they will have similar bargaining lever-
age and the negotiated price would likely end up close to
$275,000.
In practice, neither negotiating party will know perfectly
the other side's alternatives, degree of patience, or reservation
price. But the Nash bargaining model is nevertheless com-
monly thought to provide a reasonable basis for predicting
the bargaining outcome. In the Comcast-NBCU transac-
tion, the model was originally proposed by economists work-
ing with rival MVPDs, and used (as well as criticized) by
Comcast's economists.5i
In applying the model, the Commission relied on evi-
dence from a recent academic study to conclude that the
joint venture would have roughly equal bargaining skill or
patience as MVPDs other than Comcast (specifically satellite
and telephone company providers) when negotiating over
cable programming. 52 When the bargaining skill is even, the
Nash model implies that any increase in the cost to Comcast
of providing the programming to an MVPD would be ex-
pected to raise the negotiated price by half the cost increase.5
The merger can be thought of as raising the "opportunity
cost" of programming to the joint venture-the value of the
joint venture's next best alternative to selling the programming
to a rival MVPD. The opportunity cost at issue is not an out-
of-pocket production cost but reflects the value to Comcast as
a video distributor of denying access to joint venture pro-
gramming to its rival. Doing so could benefit Comcast by
shifting subscribers and profits to Comcast's video distribution
system. Accordingly, the per-customer opportunity cost of
programming to Comcast equals Comcast's per subscriber
MVPD profit margin times the probability that the customer
would switch to Comcast in the event a rival MVPD loses
access to the programming. That probability, which varies by
MVPD, equals the product of the departure rate and the
diversion rate employed in assessing the profitability of fore-
closure. 4
Applying the half-the-opportunity-cost-increase formula,
the Commission calculated the likely increase in monthly
per-subscriber prices for the bundle of NBCU programming
contributed to the joint venture resulting from vertical inte-
gration with Comcast. 5 The Commission also calculated
the likely increase in retransmission consent fees for the NBC
broadcast network in areas where a broadcast station in the
joint venture overlaps with Comcast's cable footprint. The
Commission found that programming prices for the NBCU
cable networks as a bundle, and for the NBC broadcast net-
work individually, would be expected to increase for all
Comcast's MVPD rivals.56
EmpiricalAnalysis of Programming Prices. The FCC
confirmed that vertical transactions between MVPDs and
content providers tend to lead to higher programming prices
to rival MVPDs through an empirical analysis of the change
in affiliate fees following the vertical integration of Fox pro-
gramming with the DIRECTV direct broadcast satellite
video distribution system in the wake of the 2004 News
Corp./Hughes transaction. The analysis employed a "differ-
ence-in-differences" regression model examining the affiliate
fees MVPDs paid for national cable networks in which News
Corp. had a controlling interest before and after the transac-
tion, and comparing them with fees paid for networks that
did not become more or less vertically integrated during the
same period. 7 The study found that higher programming
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prices resulted from vertical integration. By introducing a
variable to adjust for changes in program quality, the FCC
was able to attribute the price increase to the change in the
integrated firm's bargaining position, consistent with the pre-
dictions of its bargaining model. 8
Past Anticompetitive Discrimination. A fourth eco-
nomic study examined whether Comcast had favored its own
programming pre-transaction and, if so, whether it favored
its programming in order to harm competition or obtain
efficiencies. To differentiate between foreclosure and effi-
ciency hypotheses, the Commission adopted a method sug-
gested by Professor Austan Goolsbee.59 Goolsbee pointed
out that an MVPD has the greatest ability to act anticom-
petitively in settings in which it faces the least competition
from rival MVPDs. Accordingly, the Commission used
econometric methods (logit regression) to identify the prob-
ability that Comcast carried four national networks in which
it had a controlling interest, and to determine how those
probabilities varied with the degree of competition in local
markets. The study found that Comcast was more likely to
carry the affiliated network the smaller the share of sub-
scribers in the market that selected a rival MVPD rather
than Comcast, indicating "that Comcast favors its own pro-
gramming for anticompetitive reasons.""o The Commission
concluded that "these patterns of anticompetitive discrimi-
nation in carriage rates would likely extend to the carriage
decisions related to NBCU networks."6 1
Conclusion
The FCC's extensive analysis of vertical foreclosure in evalu-
ating the Comcast-NBCU transaction provides a template for
courts and litigants considering similar issues in future trans-
actions. The FCC adapted the modern economic analysis of
exclusionary conduct to shape a roadmap for evaluating the
foreclosure concerns arising from a vertical merger, and it
relied on a range of economic methods in applying that road-
map to the facts of the transaction it reviewed. Notwith-
standing the difference between administrative adjudication
under a public interest standard and judicial decision-mak-
ing under the Clayton Act, the structure of the legal analysis
and the types of economic studies the Commission employed
promise to influence the approach that antitrust tribunals will
take in evaluating vertical mergers in the future.E
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